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ABSTRACT

In an attempt to motivate the transition away from fossil fuels, reduce carbon
emissions and diversify electricity supply, twenty-nine states and the District of
Columbia have adopted a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS). An RPS is a form of
regulation that requires increased electricity production from renewable energy sources.
These standards vary by state but generally require a minimum percentage of electricity
generation to come from renewable technologies by a predetermined date.
In the first chapter I examine the effect of the adoption of an RPS on electricity
rates, making use of the increased availability of data since several policies’ adoption.
Using a fifty state panel over the years 1990-2010, this study uses a difference-indifference and a fixed effects estimation to measure how the adoption of an RPS affects
the price of electricity in state markets. Empirical findings show that states that have
adopted an RPS have approximately a 20% higher all-retail electricity price than states
that do not have RPS. Following the adoption of this regulation, a state can expect to see
electricity prices rise by roughly 5% on average per year relative to states with no RPS.
Once the legislation has been in place for almost a decade, electricity rates begin to
dramatically increase upwards of 10% per year.
In the second chapter, I observe the economic, social and political factors that
prompt a state to adopt a Renewable Portfolio Standard. , I estimate a probit model to
determine the probability a state will adopt an RPS in a year given its present political
and economic climate. Results show that a deregulated electricity market, a high per-
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capita GDP, a strong democratic presence in the state legislature, high renewable
capacity, and a strong incidence of natural gas are indicators a state will pass an RPS.
Whether or not a state is a net importer or exporter of electricity is not a significant
indicator of adoption of an RPS within a state.
The third chapter focuses on Renewable Energy Credits (RECs). In order to prove
compliance with the RPS regulation established by the state legislature, an electric utility
must produce RECs to a state regulatory commission. One REC represents one megawatt
hour of electricity generated from renewable technologies. As the market for tradable
RECs develops, it becomes increasingly important to examine the scope and effects
credit trading may have on energy production and prices. As credit trading has had very
little experience to date in the United States this paper serves to present a detailed
description of the emerging market for RECs and discuss possible implications it may
have on policy implementation, investment in renewable energy production and prices to
the consumer. An examination is given to the New Jersey Solar Renewable Energy
Credit (SREC) market.
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CHAPTER I

HOW DOES THE ADOPTION OF A RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD
IMPACT STATE ELECTRICITY RATES

I.

INTRODUCTION

Due to concerns over energy prices and global climate change, public interest in
policies that promote renewable energy has become increasing popular. In the United
States, the federal government has devoted substantial subsides to the production of
renewable energy. Since 2009, the Department of the Interior has approved 29 onshore
renewable energy projects that harvest energy from solar, wind and geothermal power.
By the end of 2012, the federal government plans to issues permits for ten thousand
megawatts of renewable power on public lands and off shore waters. Putting this in
perspective, it is enough to power 3 million homes.1
At the state level, Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) have emerged as a
popular tool to motivate the transition away from fossil fuels, reduce carbon emissions
and diversify electricity supply. An RPS is a form of legislation that requires an increased
production of electricity generation to come from renewable energy sources.2 Typically,
each utility company must provide a minimum percentage of its total electricity sales
from renewable sources by a specific date (Palmer and Burtraw). To ensure compliance,
1

http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/
Renewable energy is defined as any naturally occurring, inexhaustible source of energy. In terms of an
RPS, each state defines what qualifies as renewable energy in its legislation and these technologies differ
by state.
2
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states with an RPS establish penalties for utilities that fail to meet specified targets. A
utility may meet its target by either producing renewable energy itself or purchasing
renewable energy credits from other utilities. To date, twenty-nine states and the District
of Columbia have adopted an RPS mandate. Additionally, eight other states have
established renewable portfolio goals. However, these goals are not legally binding and
utilities face no penalty for non-compliance.
As RPS’s become increasingly popular, it is necessary to understand how they
will impact the electricity market. Previous research offers minimal consensus on the
impacts of these policies.

Proponents of the legislation argue an RPS will reduce

greenhouse gas emissions and produce substantial environmental benefits at a negligible
cost to society. Alternatively adversaries of an RPS claim that the regulation only distorts
investment choice to higher priced renewable technologies which utilities will in turn
pass on increased costs to consumers.
This study’s goal is to examine the effect of the adoption of an RPS on electricity
rates, making use of the increased availability of data since several policies’ adoption. A
fifty state panel data set over the years 1990-2010 was compiled from the United States
Energy Information Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Database of
State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE). To date, minimal empirical
research has been done on the impact of Renewable Portfolio Standards. The majority of
these policies have been adopted over the past decade thus offering little historical data.
The first states to pass an RPS during this time frame are Massachusetts & Nevada in
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1997, followed by Connecticut in 1998 and Maine, New Jersey, Texas and Wisconsin in
1999. A data set from 1990-2010 across all fifty states has been assembled providing 13
years of observed electricity prices following the adoption of the first RPS.3
An RPS is a form of regulation that mandates a certain percentage of all generated
electricity must come from renewable energy sources. One can assume that prior to the
introduction of an RPS, electric utilities are operating efficiently using the lowest cost
methods of production. If renewable technologies were more efficient than conventional
fossil fuels, utilities would already be using these as a primary source of energy
production. Currently, coal and natural gas constitute the main sources of electricity
production. By coercing utilities to adopt alternative energy sources, economic theory
suggests that the introduction of this regulation should increase electricity prices.
Using both difference-in-difference and fixed effects models I estimate how the
adoption of an RPS impacts electricity prices. The difference-in-difference estimation
indicates that prior to adoption of this regulation RPS states have approximately a 20%
higher all-retail electricity price than states that do not have RPS. Following the passage
of an RPS, a state can expect to see electricity prices rise by approximately 5% on
average per year relative to states with no RPS. The fixed effects estimation breaks down
the impact of an RPS by year, revealing that immediately after the legislation is passed
there is little impact on price. Prices begin to rise upwards of 5% per year during the fifth

3

Iowa was the first state to pass an RPS in 1983. However it has been dropped from this analysis because it
adopted its policy prior to the start of the sample period thus preventing measurement of any observed
change after implementation.
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year post adoption. Once the legislation has been in place for almost a decade, electricity
rates begin to dramatically increase upwards of 10% per year.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section two provides a detailed background on
RPS policies, as well as a literature review. Section three summarizes that panel data set
that was constructed and defines the empirical model. Section four presents the estimated
results obtained from the specified model. Lastly, section five concludes the study with a
summary of principal findings.

II.

RPS BACKGROUND

The first RPS was implemented in Iowa in 1983; however, it was not until the late
1990s that renewable portfolio standards began to gain in popularity. In order to mitigate
climate change and motivated the transition away from fossil fuels, state governments
began designing RPS policies to encourage investment and production of renewable
resources. There are currently twenty nine states and Washington D.C. with a binding
RPS in effect and 8 additional states that have renewable portfolio goals. Table 1.1
describes the ultimate targets of the states that have adopted an RPS.
Renewable Portfolio Standards vary by state, but in general require a minimum
quantity of electricity to be generated from renewable energy sources by a predetermined
date. This quantity may be measured in absolute units (kWh or kW) or as a percentage of
total production. In several states the RPS also allows for trading of renewable energy
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credits (REC) to meet the established requirement. For each unit of power generated, a
REC is issued. RECs may be purchased, banked or borrowed so that a utility company
may meet the established standards.
In order to ensure compliance with the RPS, a state will impose penalties if a utility
company fails to reach its target. A penalty may be pre-established or may be arbitrary
and decided upon based on how short the utility fell of compliance. Some states have
highest penalties for repeat violations while others escalate penalties on an annual basis
according to price indices.
When designing an RPS, each state takes into account its specific goals, resource
endowments, political considerations, and growth potential of renewable energy. Based
on existing infrastructure, each policy specifies a different target and competition year.
Lyon and Yin (2009) conclude that RPS adoption is primarily driven by political
ideology and private interests rather than environmental benefits. They find states that
were early adopters of an RPS had high renewable potential, a strong Democratic
presence in the state legislature, low reliance on natural gas and a restructured electricity
market.
Given the political landscape and existing infrastructure, each state defines an
assorted list of eligible technologies. Table 1.2 summarizes eligible technologies for the
RPS policies in existence. All thirty policies count biofuels, biomass, hydropower, solar
power and wind as renewable energy sources while Ohio is the only state to consider
nuclear power a renewable. Additionally, an RPS may require particular goals regarding
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a specific energy source. For example, Illinois has a target of twenty-five percent,
18.75% of which must come from wind power. North Carolina specifies that 0.2% should
come from swine waste while 900,000 MWH must be generated by poultry waste.
Arguments have been made in favor, as well as against, the adoption of an RPS. The
stated goals of the typical RPS are to reduce dependency on foreign oil, strengthen
energy security, improve environmental quality and enhance economic development
(Huang et al, 2007). Chen et al (2009) claim that adopting an RPS will diversify the
electricity supply and produce substantial environmental benefits. The diversification of
energy supply helps to control for potential supply shocks from volatile fuel prices.
Additionally, coal, petroleum and natural gas are exhaustible resources thus their supply
ultimately be depleted. An RPS helps to motivate the transition away from exhaustible
fuels to renewable energy sooner rather than later. Furthermore, renewable energy has
lower social and environmental risks compared to conventional fossil fuels. Renewable
energy produces fewer greenhouse gases and has no risk of radiation exposure compared
to nuclear power (Jaccard, 2004).
The benefits of adopting an RPS are mainly focus on diversifying energy supply
and as a tool to mitigate climate change. However these benefits are produced at a
substantial cost. Simulation studies performed by the Energy Information Administration
(EIA) in 2002 conclude that a 10% national RPS could raise electricity prices to the
consumer by 1.5% while a 20% national RPS has the potential to raise prices up to 4%.
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Palmer and Burtraw (2005) perform a comparable simulation and find that a 15%
national RPS mandate would raise electricity prices by 2% by 2020.
Michaels (2008) claims that the EIA’s estimate of a 4% rise in prices is
underestimated based upon the model. He claims the likely impact of an RPS will be
significantly greater. The EIA’s National Energy Modeling System estimations depend
heavily on vast advances in technology. Michaels asserts that these technological change
assumptions are unreasonable as these assumptions produce results that have a relatively
minor effect on prices while in reality one should expect the impact to by much larger.
Renewables currently produce approximately 3 percent of all power generation in the
United States, roughly the same percentage share as in the early 1990s. In order make
renewables a viable and competitive option, vast investment in the necessary
infrastructure must be made to produce and harvest renewable energy. Michaels notes the
intermittency of renewable energy. On a cloudy or windless day it is impossible to
harvest solar or wind energy.
Fischer (2006) develops a theoretical model of the effect of an RPS on electricity
prices showing that the effect on prices will depend on the relative elasticities of the
supply curve for both conventional fossil fuels and renewable energy sources. Her
framework is developed on the assumption that an RPS functions as a tax on fossil fuels
in order to subsidize renewable energy. Thus, if the supply curve of renewables is more
elastic than that of fossil fuels, an RPS will lower electricity rates. Conversely, if the
supply of fossil fuels is more elastic than renewable, an RPS will raise prices. The
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elasticity of demand will only influence the magnitude of the price effect, not the
direction.
In one of the first empirical studies on the effect of an RPS mandate, Tra (2009) uses
a panel data set of 2,602 electric utilities and finds that residential electricity prices
increase approximately 4% after adoption. Additionally he finds that the effect of an RPS
on residential prices is significantly lower in states with higher wind and solar potential
and the impact on prices is larger in states that have stricter requirements. Hansen, Kirsch
and O’Sheasy (2007) perform a fixed effect regression, controlling for coal & natural gas
prices and energy generation mix, concluding that states that pass an RPS experience a
0.35% larger annual increase in average retail prices than states that do not have an RPS.
This study uses a panel data set across 50 states over 20 years to estimate how
electricity rates differ in RPS states versus non-RPS states. Empirical findings show that
RPS states are fundamentally different from non-RPS states as RPS states have a 20%
higher all-retail electricity rates at the start of the sample period than non-RPS states.
Consistent with previous literature, I find prices increases on average approximately 5%
per year post adoption. However, this study goes one step further as it is the first to
estimate the impact of an RPS on prices in each individual year post adoption of the
regulation.
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III.

METHODOLOGY
i.

Difference-in-Difference Model

In this study I employ both a difference-in-difference estimator and a fixed effects
model to determine the effect of an RPS in the subsequent years following its adoption.
The following difference–in-difference regression is estimated using ordinary least
squares on a panel data set over the years 1990-2010.

The outcome of interest,

, is the log of all retail electricity prices in KWH in

state s during year t. The treatment group is denoted by a dummy variable,

,

equaling one if state s has ever adopted an RPS and zero otherwise. This treatment
variable serves to capture systematic differences between those states that have adopted
an RPS during the sample period and those that have never adopted the regulation.
The variable

is a series of time period dummy variables

indicating the year in which state s implemented its RPS. These dummy variables take a
value of zero in the years before a state adopted an RPS and assumes a value of one in
years after a state has adopted an RPS. This serves to distinguish between pre and post
RPS legislation as well as capture any aggregate factors that would cause changes in
electricity prices absent of the policy adoption.
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The difference-in-difference estimator is the interaction between the treatment
variable and the year in which an RPS is adopted. The coefficient δ on
) measures how an RPS affects price in the subsequent years post
adoption. The magnitude of δ will estimate how post adoption electricity rates vary from
the baseline difference estimated by β. One would expect a positive coefficient on δ,
suggesting that the introduction of the regulation increases electricity rates.
Lastly,

is a vector of covariates that are believed to influence electricity rates.

These controls include the following: restructured electricity market, per capita GDP,
coal price, natural gas price, number of electricity customers in the state, and percentage
of electricity generation coming from coal, natural gas and renewable technologies. The
variable restructured electricity market is dummy variable that is equal to one if a state
has a restructured market in year t and zero otherwise. Deregulation of the electricity
market should result in increased competition that would ultimately reduce generation
costs and in turn, electricity prices. Per capita GDP is the natural log of per capita GDP
in state s during year t. The price of coal and the price of natural gas are converted to real
2010 dollars and are measured in cents per million BTU. Finally, the percentage of
electricity generation coming from coal, natural gas and renewable technologies is
computed by dividing the total number of megawatt hours generated by each respective
source by the total number of megawatt hours generated within the state.
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ii.

Fixed Effects Model

In the second estimated model, fixed effects estimation is employed where the
outcome of interest is the log of all retail electricity prices in KWH in state s during year
t. In this model a series of year indicator dummies are created to indicate the number of
years since an RPS has been adopted in state s. These indicator variables measure the
effect of the RPS on electricity rates in the subsequent years after enactment of the
legislation. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity both state and year fixed
effects have been applied. These fixed effects account for any unobserved state and time
characteristics that could potentially influence electricity rates as well as influence that
adoption of RPS regulation. The estimated regression is denoted by the following model:
∑
(2)
Here,

is the natural log of all-retail electricity prices in state s during year t.

There are fourteen indicator variables, one for each year that a state has had an RPS in
effect. In the initial year that a state has passes an RPS,
zero otherwise. If a state has had an RPS in effect for two years,

is equal to one and
(

) is equal

to one and zero otherwise. This continues until the fourteenth year the legislation has
been in place. The purpose of the indicator variables is to measure the effect of the
legislation in each year subsequent adoption. In this sample, Massachusetts having
passed their RPS in 1997 is the only state to have the legislation in play for fourteen
years. There are eight states that have had at least ten years of data with an active RPS.
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These include Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey, Texas
and Wisconsin.
is a vector of controls that are believed to influence electricity rates. These are the
same set of controls that were employed in the difference-in-difference estimation. They
include a dummy variable for a restricted electricity market, log of per capita GDP, coal
price, natural gas price, number of electricity customers in the state, and percentage of
electricity generation coming from coal, natural gas and renewable technologies.

IV.

DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE
The data set complied for this analysis is a cross sectional panel that includes fifty

states over the years 1990-2010. All data concerning electricity prices, generation, sales,
number of customers and input prices were obtained from the United States Energy
Information Administration. Data on retail sales, revenues, prices and number of
customers in each sector were taken from the EIA’s “Annual Electric Power Industry
Report, EIA-861. Generation and composition of electricity supply data were taken from
the EIA’s Annual Electric Generator Report,” EIA-860, and the EIA’s “Power Plant
Operations Report,” EIA-923. All data regarding Renewable Portfolio Standards
including presence of the regulation, year an RPS was passed, stringency of the standard
and target completion dates were gathered from the Database of State Incentives for
Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE). Finally, all data pertaining to population and
income were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Across all fifty states from 1990 to 2010 the average electricity price is 9.93
cents/KWH. The highest observed price was in Hawaii in 2008 at 30.23 cents/KWH
while the lowest was 4.96 in Washington in 1991. The presence of an RPS is observed in
19% of observations while a restructured electricity market is observed 27% of the time.
Coal is found to be the principal source of electricity generation on average comprising of
48% of a state’s electricity generating capacity. Table 1.3 provides a complete summary
of the variables included in this study.
Throughout the 1990’s, electricity rates steadily declined, reaching their minimum in
1999. After 1999, electricity rates began to rise, with sharp increases from 2005 to 2008.
Following the onset of the recession in 2008, prices leveled off at approximately ten cents
per kilowatt hour. This trend can be seen in the blue line in Figure 1.1 which depicts the
US Average of All-Retail Electricity Prices. The period of rising electricity prices since
2000 coincides with the increased rate of adoption of RPS legislation. Before 2000 there
were only seven states with an RPS. Since 2000, an additional twenty-two states have
passed an RPS.
Further examination of Figure 1.1 reveals that the electricity markets in states that
have an RPS are fundamentally different from those states that have never adopted an
RPS. The red line indicates the average across all states that have ever adopted an RPS
while the blue line is the average across all states that have never had an RPS. From the
start of the sample period, RPS states have higher electricity rates than non-RPS states.
Average electricity rates among states that have an RPS are roughly 20% higher than
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states that have never adopted an RPS. This equates to approximately 2 cents per kilowatt
hour. Additionally, as electricity rates began to rise in 2000, RPS states experienced
faster increases in their rates versus non-RPS states as the gap between these two lines
continues to widen.
Figure 1.2 further examines differences in RPS versus non-RPS states by breaking
RPS states down into three categories: early, mid and late adopters of the regulation.
Early adopters passed an RPS between 1997 and 2000, mid-adopters passed their RPS
from 2001-2005 and late adopters passed an RPS post 2006. Examination of Figure 1.2
reveals that early adopters have significantly higher electricity rates than all other states.
Mid-adopters perform similar to early adopters however average slightly lower rates than
early adopters.

Conversely, late adopters have electricity rates below that national

average and appear similar to non-RPS states. Beginning in 2004, early adopters saw
dramatic increases in average electricity rates before beginning to declining in 2008. For
these early adopters, an RPS had been in effect for at least five years. One may
hypothesize that the regulation began to impact electricity rates before the onset of the
recession in 2008. Similarly, for mid-adopters prices began to increase in 2005, however
not nearly as dramatic as early adopters. Late adopters saw small increases in their
electricity rates comparable to that of non-RPS states. Figure 1.3 further compares RPS
and non-RPS states to states with a non-binding RPS goal. These eight RPS-goal states
are nearly identical to non-RPS states with significantly lower rates than the national
average. Following 2004, RPS Goal states have lower average electricity rates than nonRPS states.

14

Table 1.4 describes the summary statistics of the covariates at the start of the
sample period in 1990 and at the conclusion in 2010. It breaks the data down into three
categories: All States, RPS States and Non-RPS States. In 1990, 2% of states (Iowa) had
already adopted an RPS versus 58%, 29 states total, in 2010. At the start of the sample
period, no states had begun deregulation of their electricity markets where as by 2010,
44% of states had some sort of market restructuring. This percentage increases when only
considering RPS States; of all states that have passed an RPS, two-thirds of them have a
restructured electricity market. The average all retail price of electricity increased from
9.8 cents/KWH to 10.04 cents/KWH but in Non-RPS States the average price decreased
from 10.04 to 8.44 cents/KWH.
Table 1.5 describes the percentage changes of the covariates from 1990 to 2010.
Over the sample period, real electricity prices increased roughly 1%. In RPS States,
roughly 6% whereas in Non-RPS States prices have decreased nearly 6%. The percentage
of electricity generation from coal has decreased 15% however the percentage generation
coming from natural gas has increased over 100%. In RPS States it has increased 145%
and in Non-RPS States it has increased 90%.
A raw examination of the data suggests that RPS states fundamentally differ from
non-RPS states. The adoption of RPS regulations cause electricity rates to grow faster in
states where they have been implemented. However, this simplistic analysis does not
control for any other factors that may affect electricity prices. Through the difference-indifference estimation and a fixed effects model, a more precise analysis can be made.
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V.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The difference-in-difference estimation results of RPS adoption are shown in Table
1.6. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term
which estimates the effect of the presence of an RPS after it has been enacted. The
dummy variable

estimates the difference between RPS and non-RPS states.

Column 1 runs a basic difference-in-difference regression absent of any controls. Results
show that the treatment group, RPS states, have approximately 20.5% higher electricity
rates than states that have never adopted the regulation. The coefficient of interest on
finds that once a state adopts an RPS, electricity rates
will rise an average of 5.46%.
Column 2-4 of Table 1.6 employ various controls that are believed to impact
electricity rates. These include a restructured electricity market, the log of per capita
GDP, the price of coal and natural gas, and the percentage generation of electricity
coming from coal and natural gas. The best fit comes from column 4 with an R 2 of 0.39.
Here I find that the RPS states have roughly an 18.76% higher electricity rate compared
to states that have never adopted an RPS. Additionally, once a state has adopted the
regulation, price is expected to increase by 4.8%. Both treatment variable (RPS states)
and difference-in-difference estimator are found to be significant at the 1% level. These
results are similar to Tra (2009) who finds that electricity rates increase approximately 34% post adoption and Palmer and Burtraw (2005) who simulate that a national 15% RPS
mandate would raise electricity prices by 4%. The price of coal and the percent of
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electricity generation coming from natural gas both positively affect electricity rates are
found to be significant at 1% level. A 1% increase in the price of coal increases
electricity prices 0.04% and a 1% increase in the percent generation coming from natural
gas increases electricity prices 18%.
Table 1.7 presents the results from the fixed effects estimation. This model estimates
the effect of an RPS in each subsequent year post adoption. Indication dummy variables
were created for each year the regulation has been in play. For example, the variable
year1 measures the effect of an RPS in the first year an RPS is passed and year2
measures the effect in the second year after adoption compared to the base year. For
Massachusetts, which passed its RPS in 1997, year1 would be the effect in 1997 while
year2 would be the effect of the RPS in 1998. Kansas, which passed its RPS in 2010,
year1 would be measured as 2010 and there would be no measured effect for year2 since
the sample ends in 2010.
Column 1 presents a simple OLS regression with no controls to be used as a baseline
comparison. Column 2 introduces both state and year fixed effects without any controls.
These fixed effects account for any unobserved state and time characteristics that could
potentially influence electricity rates as well as influence that adoption of RPS regulation.
In the fixed effects regression I find electricity rates increasing by almost 3% in the first
year of adoption. In each subsequent year, rates continually rise. In years 2-5 prices
increase by 3.9%, 4%, 4.1% and 6.3% respect to the base year. Eight years after the
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regulation has been in effect, prices begin to increase dramatically with a 12.25% rise.
Prices reach their largest increase after 13 years in effect with 20.88% increase.
Column 4 of Table 1.7 introduces various controls that are believed to impact
electricity rates. These include a dummy variable whether a market has undergone some
form of deregulation, the total number of customers serviced in the state, coal price,
natural gas price and GDP per capita. The addition of these control variables to the model
produces similar results and improves the fit of the model. In each of the first eight years
after the regulation has been passed, prices increase on average by 4% per year. In the
ninth year after adoption prices rise dramatically with an 11.34% increase. In years 10 –
12 prices continue to greatly rise with increases of 16.79%, 14.44% and 13.07%.
Comparable to the first model, prices reach their largest increase in year 13 with a
19.02% increase. Also positively impacting the price of electricity is the total number of
customers served in the market and the price of coal. This is a logical result as the more
customers served in a given market results in higher demand and thus higher prices.
Additionally, coal is a principal input in the production of electricity, accounting for
nearly half of all electricity generated in the United States during the sample period. An
increase in price of a primary input of electricity results in increased generation costs and
thus increased prices.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

As Renewable Portfolio Standards have gained in popularity as a means of promoting
renewable technologies it is necessary to understand the impact they will have on
electricity markets. To date, twenty-nine states and Washington DC have passed an RPS
and there is discussion in Congress over a national Renewable Portfolio Standard. To
date there has been minimal empirical research done on the impact of an RPS. The
majority of these policies have been implemented over the past decade, offering little
historical data post adoption. Most research on the impact of an RPS has been done
through simulation models to predict future prices.
Using a fifty state panel over the years 1990-2010, this study uses a difference-indifference and fixed effects estimation to measure how the adoption of an RPS affects the
price of electricity in each state market. Through a difference-in-difference and a fixed
effects estimation, I find that RPS states have on average a 20% higher all retail
electricity price than states that have never adopted the legislation. Once an RPS has been
passed, electricity rates begin to slowly rise. Following the adoption of an RPS, a state
can expect to see electricity prices rise by roughly 5% on average per year.
This study adds to previous literature as it is the first to estimate the impact of an
RPS on prices in each individual year post adoption of the regulation. Immediately after
an RPS has been passed there is minimal impact on electricity rates. I estimate prices rise
by roughly 3%. Following the fifth year post-adoption I see larger increases of 5-6% per
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year. Subsequent the eighth year an RPS has been in effect, dramatic prices increases can
be expected upwards of 10% per year.
Immediately after adoption there is no immediate pressure to conform to these
RPS mandates. Target completion dates are in the distant future thus putting little
pressure on electricity rates.

As target completion dates slowly approach one may

anticipate that electricity rates will continue to rise in order to meet these goals. The
results obtained in this study are logical and consistent with this conjecture. Once the
legislation has been in place for almost a decade, electricity rates begin to experience
dramatic increases. As electricity prices in RPS states continue to rise, it remains to be
seen if this upward price trend is sustainable for consumers in these markets.
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TABLE 1.1:
State

Year Initially Passed

Compliance Year Standard

Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Hawaii
Iowa
Illinois
Kansas
Massachusetts
Maryland
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
North Carolina
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
Nevada
New York
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

2006
2002
2004
1998
2005
2005
2004
1983
2007
2009
1997
2004
1999
2008
2007
2008
2005
2008
2007
1999
2002
1997
2004
2009
2007
2004
2004

2025
2030
2020
2020
2025
2020
2030
2025
2020
2020
2022
2017
2015
2025
2021
2015
2021
2025
2021
2020
2025
2015
2025
2025
2020
2019

15.00%
33.00%
20.00%
23.00%
25.00%
20.00%
40.00%
105 MW per year
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
20.00%
40.00%
10.00%
25.00%
15.00%
15.00%
12.50%
23.80%
22.50%
20.00%
25.00%
29.00%
25.00%
25.00%
18.00%
16.00%

Texas

1999

2015

5,880 MW

Washington
Wisconsin

2006
1999

2020
2015

15.00%
10.00%

† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/

TABLE 1.2:
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•
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•
•

•

•
•
•

•

•
•
•

•

•
•
•
•

•
•

•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

†All States count Biofuels, Biomass, Hydro, Landfill Gas, Photovoltaics, Wind as renewable energy
sources
†† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/
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Wave

•

Waste Tire

Solar
Thermal

•

Tidal

Ocean
Thermal

•
•
•

Nuclear

•

•

Municipal
Waste

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

Geothermal

•

Fuel Cells

•
•
•
•
•
•

Energy
Efficiency

Waste Heat

Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Hawaii
Iowa
Illinois
Kansas
Massachusetts
Maryland
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
North
Carolina
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
Nevada
New York
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Texas
Washington
Wisconsin

All States†

State

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

TABLE 1.3:
Variable
P all-retail

RPS
Deregulation

Per-capita
GDP
P Coal
P Natural Gas
Coal

Nat-gas

Renewable

All Sectors Q

Total Number
Customers

Description
Average retail
electricity rate
(cents/kwh)
One if a state has
passed an RPS in year t
One if a state has a
restructured electricity
market in year t
Per-capita GDP
Average price of coal
(cents/BTU)
Average price of natural
gas (cents/BTU)
Percentage of electricity
generation in a state
from coal
Percentage of electricity
generation in a state
from natural gas
Percentage of electricity
generation in a state
from renewable
resources
Total number of MWH
of electricity consumed
across all sectors
Total number of
customers across all
sectors

Mean
9.93

Std. Dev.
3.16

Min
4.96

Max
30.23

0.19

0.39

0

1

0.27

0.44

0

1

35,226

6,185

21,224

58,737

204.02

113.56

70.20

1669.03

532

293

0

6,123

0.48

0.30

0

0.98

0.16

0.21

0

0.98

0.14

0.21

0

0.98

66,414

62,070

4,254

358,458

2,582,587

† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ , EIA-860, EIA-861, BEA
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2,622,260 236,622 1.48E+07

TABLE 1.4:

Variable
All States

Mean
RPS States

RPS

0.020
0.034
(0.141)
(0.186)
Deregulation
0
0
(0)
(0)
Per capita
29,706.57
31,697.47
GDP
(4626.52)
(4326.48)
P all-retail
9.895
10.554
(2.455)
(2.594)
Q all sectors 54,054.160 62,204.170
(51,126.89) (59,286.41)
Coal
0.505
0.465
(0.320)
(0.317)
Nat-Gas
0.103
0.104
(0.180)
(0.181)
P coal
241.762
253.112
(74.743)
(83.035)
P natural gas
403.245
377.538
(134.165)
(72.749)
RPS
Deregulation
Per Capita
GDP
P all-retail
Q all sectors
Coal
Nat-Gas
P coal
P natural gas

0.580
(0.499)
0.440
(0.501)
39,030.84
(5539.50)
10.040
(3.548)
74,852.32
(69913.45)
0.427
(0.288)
0.229
(0.228)
278.220
(210.643)
507.750
(96.116)

1
(0)
0.660
(0.484)
40,796.66
(5558.87)
11.200
(3.944)
81,851.86
(78861.21)
0.385
(0.273)
0.256
(0.242)
302.590
(265.073)
524.850
(37.697)

Min
NonRPS
States
1990
0
(0)
0
(0)
26,957.24
(3542.82)
10.040
(3.548)
74,852.320
(69,913.45)
0.427
(0.288)
0.229
(0.228)
278.220
(210.643)
507.750
(96.116)
2010
0
(0)
0.143
(0.359)
36,592.33
(4599.42)
8.446
(2.109)
65,186.29
(55672.80)
0.486
(0.305)
0.192
(0.208)
242.900
(79.549)
485.762
(137.696)

† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ , EIA-860, EIA-861, BEA
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Max

Obs

0

1

50

0

0

50

21,224

42,391

50

5.188

14.466

50

4254

237,415

50

0

0.976

50

0

0.792

49

108

581

44

188

830

39

0

1

50

0

1

50

31,071

54,239

50

6.2

25.12

50

5595

358,458

50

0

0.967

50

0

0.980

50

111

1561

49

0

689

48

TABLE 1.5:
Variable
RPS
Deregulation
Per capita GDP
P all-retail
P coal
P natural gas
Q all sectors
Coal
Natural Gas

ALL

RPS

Non-RPS

28

28

0.314
0.015
0.151
0.259
0.385
-0.153
1.229

0.287
0.061
0.195
0.390
0.316
-0.173
1.452
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0.357
-0.060
0.078
0.113
0.523
-0.130
0.909

TABLE 1.6:
Dependent Variable: ln(Price-all sectors)
(1)
(2)
0.2056** 0.2321***
(0.0741)
(0.0603)
0.0024
0.0494***
(0.0084)
(0.0118)
0.0546***
0.0375*
(0.0111)
(0.0116)
Deregulation
-0.0279*
(0.0102)
ln Per-capita GDP
0.1646***
(0.0437)
P Coal
P Natural Gas
Coal
Natural Gas
_cons
2

R
Obs

(3)
(4)
0.2050*** 0.1876***
(0.0410)
(0.0435)
0.0307
0.0022
(0.0133)
(0.0139)
0.0383** 0.0482***
(0.0126)
(0.0131)
-0.0081
0.0122
(0.0105)
(0.0110)
-0.1310** -0.0863*
(0.0473)
(0.0506)
0.0003*** 0.0004***
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
-.000002
-1E-05
(.00001)
(1.06E05)
-0.0383
(0.0567)
0.1895***
(0.0558)
3.5894*** 2.9195***
(0.4827)
(0.5199)

2.1112***
(0.0560)

3.9830***
(0.4497)

0.1066

0.1212

0.2234

0.3934

1029

1029

1029

1029

*** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level
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TABLE 1.7:
OLS
(1)
0.0382**
(0.0162)
0.0483***
(0.0169)
0.0388**
(0.0172)
0.0384**
(0.0180)
0.0634***
(0.0193)
0.0437**
(0.0203)
0.0583**
(0.0215)
0.1179***
(0.0272)
0.1099***
(0.0287)
0.1699***
(0.0304)
0.1321***
(0.0351)
0.1214***
(0.0351)
0.1758***
(0.0493)
0.0344
(0.0851)

FE
(2)
0.0299*
(0.0160)
0.0390**
(0.0167)
0.0409**
(0.0172)
0.0413**
(0.0181)
0.0634***
(0.0194)
0.0509**
(0.0206)
0.0614**
(0.0220)
0.1225***
(0.0271)
0.1291***
(0.0286)
0.1902***
(0.0305)
0.1595***
(0.0350)
0.1509***
(0.0353)
0.2088***
(0.0486)
0.0649
(0.0823)

2.2386***
(0.0341)

State FE
Year FE

year1
year2
year3
year4
year5
year6
year7
year8
year9
year10
year11
year12
year13
year14

2.2651***
(0.0112)

OLS
(3)
0.0155
(0.0175)
0.0241
(0.0184)
0.0059
(0.0193)
0.0143
(0.0198)
0.0127
(0.0216)
0.0021
(0.0224)
0.0173
(0.0239)
0.0382
(0.0295)
0.0621**
(0.0315)
0.1058**
(0.0335)
0.0839**
(0.0363)
0.0684**
(0.0366)
0.1261**
(0.0494)
-0.0072
(0.0836)
0.0279**
(0.0108)
2.07e-08**
(7.16e-09)
0.0563***
(0.0174)
0.0031
(0.0088)
-0.0462
(0.0373)
2.3224***
(0.4012)

FE
(4)
0.0281**
(0.0160)
0.0385**
(0.0168)
0.0306**
(0.0177)
0.0474**
(0.0184)
0.0449**
(0.0200)
0.0362**
(0.0207)
0.0534**
(0.0223)
0.0777**
(0.0272)
0.1134***
(0.0291)
0.1679***
(0.0310)
0.1444***
(0.0335)
0.1307***
(0.0338)
0.1902***
(0.0454)
0.0722
(0.0763)
0.0013
(0.0104)
2.02e-08**
(1.04e-08)
0.1768***
(0.0247)
-0.0171
(0.0118)
-0.1293
(0.0859)
2.6281**
(0.9297)

No

Yes

No

Yes

deregulated
Total Num.
Customers
ln P Coal
ln P Nat-Gas
ln per capita
GDP
cons

No

Yes

No

Yes

2

R

0.12

0.11

0.28

0.33

Obs

1029

1029

868

868
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CHAPTER II

DETERMING IF A STATE WILL ADOPT A RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARD

I.

INTRODUCTION

As worldwide concern over climate change and environmental degradation grows, the
use of clean and renewable energy has become increasingly common. In the United
States, public concern regarding the environment has helped persuade policymakers to
implement various policies and regulations that promote the development of renewable
technologies. These include cap and trade programs, where government limits the amount
of pollution a firm may emit and any unused allowances may be traded on the market, a
renewable energy production tax credit, where renewable energy producers are given the
motivation to produce renewables by means of a tax incentive, simple Pigouvian taxes,
where polluters are held responsible for the damages they impose on society and
Renewable Portfolio Standards. A Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is a form of
legislation that requires an increased production of electricity generation to come from
renewable energy sources. Currently twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have
adopted RPS mandates.

The ultimate goal of an RPS is to motivate production of renewable energy as a
means of promoting energy sustainability. At the state level, RPS’s have grown
increasing popular as a means of influencing the transition away from conventional fossil
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fuels to the use of renewable energy. An RPS is initially proposed by a state legislature. It
is designed to meet a state’s goals based on current renewable capacities, resource
endowments, political considerations and growth potentials. Each state designs its
mandate by specifying an absolute number of megawatt hours or by a percentage of
overall electricity generation produce that must be produced from renewables by a
targeted future date. To prove compliance a utility may generate its own renewable
energy or purchase Renewable Energy Credits (RECs). A REC represents one megawatt
hour of renewable energy. At the end of each year RECs are submitted to the state
regulator in order to prove compliance with the RPS. In order to ensure compliance with
the standard, an RPS will establish penalties for utilities that fail to meet its specified
targets. These penalties are set above REC prices, thus creating the incentive to invest in
renewables and comply with the standard rather than pay the penalty.

Renewable Portfolio Standards have been grown increasing popular throughout the
globe. National RPS policies have been passed by several European nations, parts of
South America, Japan and Australia and New Zealand. Upon entering office, President
Barak Obama initially proposed a standard that would require 25% of the United States’
electricity to be generated from renewables by the year 2025. As of June 2013, there has
been no national RPS passed. Although there has been no adoption of a federal standard,
RPS’s have become increasing popular at the state level.

32

The emergence of RPS regulations at the state level is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Of the twenty nine states with binding RPS mandates, twenty-two have
implemented them after the year 2000. Additionally, eight other states have established
renewable portfolio goals. States with renewable goals are Vermont, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Virginia, Utah, Oklahoma and Indiana. These goals are non-binding, thus
utilities within the state do not face penalties for noncompliance. For purposes of this
study, these states will be viewed as having no RPS because there is no incentive to
comply with the RPS mandate. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the timeline of RPS adoption
rates.

This study examines the economic, social and political factors that prompt a state
to adopt a Renewable Portfolio Standard. A fifty state panel data set over the years 19902010 was assembled from the United States Energy Information Administration, Bureau
of Economic Analysis, the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency
(DSIRE), and state legislative data from Indiana State University. Using the data set
compiled for this study, I utilize a logit and probit model to determine the probability a
state will adopt an RPS in a year given the various covariates employed.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section two provides a detailed background
regarding RPS policies and provides a literature review while discussing the political
economy of adoption of an RPS. Section three summarizes that panel data set that was
constructed, provides descriptive evidence regarding policy adoption and discusses the
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empirical model. Section four examines the empirical results. Lastly, section five
concludes the study with a summary of principal findings.

II.

RPS BACKGROUND & MECHANICS

i.

Background on RPS Policies

In 1983, the state of Iowa approved the Alternative Energy Law, creating the very
first Renewable Portfolio Standard in the US. This law required Iowa’s two investor
owned utilities to own or contract a total of 105 megawatts of renewable generating
capacity and associated energy production.4 However, it was not until the late 1990s that
other states followed Iowa’s lead. Massachusetts and Nevada enacted their own RPS
policies in 1997, followed by Connecticut in 1998. Since the turn of the millennium,
twenty-two states have passed RPS legislation. In total, thirty states and the District of
Columbia have some form of an RPS. Many of these policies were introduced in states as
part of a general restructuring of electricity markets. However, an RPS was passed
through voter-approved initiatives in both Colorado and Washington (Wiser et al., 2008).
Table 2.1 summarizes those states that have adopted an RPS describing the initial year of
adoption, size of the goal and the targeted completion year. Iowa and Texas have both
designed their RPS’ to reach an absolute number of megawatt hours. The remaining
twenty seven standards are based upon a percentage of sales. Maine and Hawaii appear to
have the highest standards at 40% however this number is deceiving as these standards
4

http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=IA01R&re=1&ee=0
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only require 15% new investment. The most aggressive RPS in the United States is
California’s at 33% new investment by 2030.

In addition states with a binding standard, seven states have nonbinding
renewable portfolio goals. It is interesting to note the geographic distribution of states
with an RPS. Every state in the Northeast currently has some sort of RPS save for
Vermont (though Vermont does have voluntary renewable portfolio goals). In fact, of all
states that have no renewable portfolio standards or goals, only four are located outside
the southern United States.

The motives for adopting a Renewable Portfolio Standard vastly differ by state. One
may simplify the motives into two schools of thought: the existence of a market failure
and political motivations. First, an RPS may be used as a tool to mitigate climate change.
If climate change is viewed as an externality, the market will not be able to correct for it
without the creation of this legislation. An RPS is a means of stimulating the
development of renewable energy. By investing in the development of hydro, wind and
solar energy production of electricity shifts away from conventional fossil fuels and into
clean, green energy that will in turn reduce the amount of greenhouse gasses in the
atmosphere and help to mitigate climate change. Second is the political motivation
involved in the adoption of a Renewable Portfolio Standard. Various political groups may
lobby to pass an RPS for their own personal interests. For example, farmers may be in
favor of an RPS if the legislation has specific provision for biomass as a source of
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renewable energy. If a utility could potentially capture federal subsidy money to build a
wind farm, it would be in favor of an RPS or it may be as simple as an environmental
group lobbying its state legislature. Whichever the reason may be, this study aims to
measure which state characteristics are determining factors when an RPS is passed.

While all RPS’s aim to increase the amount of electricity generated from
renewable sources, the specifics of each standard differ from state to state. This is due to
varying objectives, resource endowments, and political landscapes of states across the US
(Chen et al , 2008). Given the political landscape and existing infrastructure, each state
defines an assorted list of eligible technologies. All thirty policies count biofuels,
biomass, hydropower, solar power and wind as renewable energy sources while Ohio is
the only state to consider nuclear power a renewable. Additionally, an RPS may require
particular goals regarding a specific energy source. For example, Illinois has a target of
twenty-five percent, 18.75% of which must come from wind power, while Nevada, New
Mexico, Massachusetts and New Jersey have specific solar carve outs that utilities must
meet. In New Jersey, 4.1% of electricity must be generated by solar energy. North
Carolina specifies that 0.2% should come from swine waste while 900,000 MWH must
be generated by poultry waste.
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ii.

Mechanics of an RPS

An RPS functions by requiring retail electricity suppliers to procure a specific
amount (minimum absolute number of megawatts or a percentage) of electricity sales
from eligible renewable technologies by a specified date. For examples, under
California’s RPS utilities must provide a minimum of 33% from eligible renewable
technologies by the year 2030 whereas Iowa must produce 105 MW per year from
eligible renewable technologies. Additionally, many states have intermediate goals which
must be met while attempting to comply with the standard.

In most states, an electric utility can demonstrate compliance with a state RPS in
two ways. If the utility is still vertically integrated it will simply generate its electricity
from eligible renewable technologies. If the state has restructured electricity market,
generation and distribution are independent. In this scenario, a generator will be issued
one Renewable Energy Credit (REC) for each megawatt hour of electricity generated.
(Wiser et al., 2008). A REC is unbundled from the actual electricity generated and is
sold as an independent commodity. While the electricity generated from renewables is
sold on the grid, the REC is sold as strictly a financial product and exists as a way to
supplement the revenue of renewable energy generators. The motivation of this structure
is to provide an extra financial incentive to prompt investment in renewable energy. As a
financial product, RECs trade on a spot market, and can be bought and traded, borrowed,
or stored for later years to give utilities flexibility in complying with current or future
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requirements. Most states allow utilities to purchase RECs to meet standards. Only New
York, Hawaii, and Iowa disallow the use of RECs for meeting RPS standards.

RECs are purchased by the utilities by means of either long term contract or on the
spot market. At the end of each year utilities submit their RECS to the state regulator in
order to prove compliance with the RPS. To ensure compliance with the standard, an RPS
will establish penalties for utilities that fail to meet its specified targets. These penalties
may be pre-established, or may be left up to the discretion of the state depending on how
far short the utility was in meeting its specified requirements. Penalties may also increase
for repeat offenders. Typically, these penalties are set above REC prices, thus creating the
incentive to invest in renewables and comply with the standard rather than pay the
penalty.

iii.

Previous Literature

The rapid emergence of Renewable Portfolio Standards over the past decade has
brought with it a wealth of new analyses focusing on political economy, cost benefit
analyses, price impacts, etc. In a study similar to this one, Huang et al. (2007) explore the
factors that influence a state’s decision to adopt an RPS. Using a logistic model, they find
that states with high Gross State Product (GSP), high growth rates and education levels,
and Democratic Party dominance typically will have a higher probability of passing an
RPS.
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Similarly, Lyon and Yin (2009) conducted an empirical study to try and explain
why a state might adopt an RPS. They find that concern surrounding the environment
was generally not a motivating factor for states when deciding whether to implement an
RPS. Instead, they find that the adoption of an RPS was more dependent on political
ideology and renewable energy potential. Essentially, states that adopted regulations
already had high levels of renewable potential, were not as reliant on natural gas, and
were largely Democratic. Furthermore, they find that states with high unemployment
rates are less likely to pass an RPS. This result is unexpected, as many legislators claim
the expansion of the renewable energy sector will result in significant job creation.

Chen et al. (2009) conducted a survey of 31 state-level studies on the impact
projections from RPS laws finding that, in general, adopting an RPS serves to diversify
the state’s energy supply and produces substantial environmental benefits. Additionally,
the diversified energy supply helps control for potential supply shocks from
unpredictable fuel prices. Jaccard (2004) summarizes the importance of RPS regulations
for motivating the transition away from fossil fuels sooner rather than later emphasizing
the reduction in greenhouse gases that would result from the increased use of renewable
technologies.

However other studies point out, that these benefits may come at a sizeable cost.
The Energy Information Administration conducted studies in 2002 to analyze the impact
of a national 10% RPS. Using a computer based, energy-economic simulation model,
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they find that this RPS would raise consumer electricity prices by around 1.5%. If the
national standard was set at 20%, prices could rise by up to 4%. Palmer and Burtraw
(2005) perform a similar simulation to the one done by the EIA. They find that a national
RPS of 15% would increase prices by approximately 4%. In accordance with the EIA’s
findings, Palmer and Burtraw find that electricity prices rise significantly as the standard
is raised above 15%. For an RPS mandate of 20% from renewable technologies, average
electricity prices would increase roughly 8% by 2020.

Michaels (2008) claims that the estimates made by the EIA are far too low. He
reviews state RPS data and claims that, contrary to popular belief, these programs are
disorganized and most are already out of compliance with their own goals. He points out
how no cost analysis was done to try and find the optimal penalty payments for utilities
failing to comply. Owing to this and other factors, he predicts that a national RPS “will at
best be an inefficient policy, and at worst it will be outright pernicious.” He enforces
these claims by analyzing the computer simulation model used by the EIA. He maintains
that the simulation was carried out with a fundamentally incorrect understanding of gas
markets. While a national RPS may serve to diversify energy supply, Michaels is
confident that it will also lead to significantly increased costs and inefficiencies for
utilities.

Cooper (2008) contests Michaels’ paper. He contends that Michaels’ state
analysis was intentionally misleading, using outdated and flawed data. Additionally, he
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suggests that the inefficiencies that do exist in the differing state RPS policies do not
mean a national RPS would suffer the same fate. In fact, Cooper argues that a national
RPS mandate would bring uniformity and predictability in the electricity market. This
would help alleviate the regulatory uncertainty utilities currently face under inconsistent
state RPS policies.

Fischer (2006) creates a theoretical model to examine whether it is possible that
an RPS could actually lower electricity prices. She finds that the impact of an RPS on
electricity prices is ambiguous, as it depends on the elasticities of supply for both
conventional fossil fuels and renewable energy sources. According to her model, if the
elasticity of supply for renewables is greater than that of conventional fossil fuels, an
RPS will actually lower electricity prices. Conversely, if the supply of fossil fuels is more
elastic than that of renewables, an RPS will result in rising electricity prices. She also
finds that elasticity of demand will only serve to influence the magnitude of these price
changes.

Tra (2009) conducted the first empirical estimation in analyzing the impact an
RPS has on state electricity prices. Using panel data from 2,602 electric utilities in the US
from 1990-2006, he finds that an RPS will, on average, increase the price of electricity by
approximately 3.8%. Furthermore, he finds that this price increase is higher for utilities
that are subjected to higher renewable standards, but lower in states with high wind and
solar energy potential.
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III.

METHODOLOGY

i.

Data

The data set complied for this analysis is a cross sectional panel that includes fifty
states over the years 1990-2010. All data concerning electricity prices, generation, sales,
number of customers and input prices were obtained from the United States Energy
Information Administration. Data on retail sales, revenues, prices and number of
customers in each sector were taken from the EIA’s “Annual Electric Power Industry
Report, EIA-861. Generation and composition of electricity supply data were taken from
the EIA’s Annual Electric Generator Report,” EIA-860, and the EIA’s “Power Plant
Operations Report,” EIA-923. All data regarding Renewable Portfolio Standards
including presence of the regulation, year an RPS was passed, stringency of the standard
and target completion dates were gathered from the Database of State Incentives for
Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE). Finally, all data pertaining to population and
income were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Iowa was the first state to adopt an RPS in 1983. For purposes of this study, Iowa
has been dropped from the sample as it adopted its RPS prior to the sample period and
thus I am unable to measure the political and economic conditions under which its state
legislature passed the standard.

Fifteen years after Iowa passed the first RPS, Nevada and Massachusetts
followed suit passing their standards in 1997. By the end of the 1990s a total of seven
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states had adopted the legislation. In 2002 both California and New Mexico passed an
RPS while all remaining standards were adopted in 2005 and later. Figure 2.1 illustrated
the total number of states with an RPS in each given year while figure 2.2 shows the
number of states adopting an RPS in each specific year.

Summary statistics for the complete data set used in this study are described in
Table 2.2. During the sample period an RPS is observed 19% of the time while a
restructured electricity market is observed 26.6% of observations. Average per capita is
found to be $35,337 while the highest is in 2007 in Connecticut at $58,737 and lowest in
1990 in Mississippi at $21,224.92. Coal is found to be the principal source of electricity
generation on average comprising of 48% of a state’s electricity generating capacity
while renewable technologies account for approximately 14% of electricity produced.
The largest renewable generation percentage within a state is found in Idaho at
approximately 98%. Upon further inspection, this is due mainly in part to large hydro
capabilities and a relatively small electricity market.

Table 2.3 further breaks down the data by early adoptions of an RPS (1997-2000),
states that have ever adopted an RPS during the sample period and those that have not.
However, 70% of states that have ever passed an RPS also have a restructured market is
observed 42% of the time versus non RPS states observing a restricted market in only
7.5% of observations. On average, RPS states have a $5,000 higher per capita GDP than
non RPS states, while early adoptions have an $8,000 higher per capita GDP than non
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RPS states. Assuming renewable electricity is a normal good, this suggests a high
willingness to pay for sustainable energy by richer states.

Early adopters have, on average, the lowest percentage of electricity generation
coming from renewable resources. However, early adopters also have the lowest percent
generation from coal at 27.5% while the highest from natural gas at 27%. Additionally,
early adoptions have a higher mean percentage of democrats in the state legislature at
56.7% than all RPS states (54.3%) and non RPS states with a mean of 52%. Lastly, early
adopters of an RPS tend to be net imports of electricity.

ii.

Empirical Specification

In this estimation the decision to adopt a Renewable Portfolio Standard is
modeled as a binary choice, adopt the legislation or not. It is denoted by the following
specification:

{
Given the discrete choice between passing an RPS or not, a conditional probability model
is appropriate to estimate the probability a state will adopt an RPS in year t. The model
will take the form:
|

)
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Where

is a vector of state specific covariates and

is a specified cumulative

distribution function. I estimate both a probit and a logit model where the probit model
follows a standard normal cumulative distribution function and assumes the form:

while the logit, follows a logistic CDF taking the form:

(

)

The decision to adopt an RPS will depend on a vector of covariates that are state
specific,

. These include a dummy variable indicating whether or not a state has a

restructured electricity market, per capita GDP, percentage of electricity generation
coming from coal, natural gas and renewable energy, the price of coal and natural gas, the
total number of customers in each state market, and if the state is a net importer or
exporter of electricity. The empirical specification to be estimated is denoted as follows:

The variable restructured electricity market is dummy variable that is equal to one if a
state has a restructured market in year t and zero otherwise. A restructured market should
increase the probability of adopting an RPS as it allows for more flexibility to meet the
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requirement. A distributor can purchase electricity from a supplier it chooses as long it
also purchases the required number of RECs needed to comply with its RPS. Assuming
clean renewable energy is a normal good, a higher per capita should increase the
probability of adoption. A higher per capita GDP should correlate to a higher willingness
to pay for renewable technologies and thus increase the likelihood of adoption.

The price of coal and natural gas should have a positive impact on RPS adoption as
should a high percentage of existing renewable capacity. As the prices of fossil fuels
increases, it becomes more likely that states will want to motivate the transition away
from fossil fuels to renewable technologies. Additionally, a high percentage of existing
renewable energy may indicate a state’s likelihood to meet a target set by an RPS. Thus
having a high amount of renewable capacity would increase chance of implementing an
RPS. Lastly, a mainly democratic state legislature is hypothesized to increase adoption
rates of an RPS.

IV.

RESULTS

The results from the probit model are presented in Table 2.4. Column 1 reports the
results from a standard probit while Column 2 presents the marginal effects, standard
errors are reported in the parentheses. The obtained results are consistent with the
hypothesized results. Recall that a restructured electricity market separates generation
from distribution in the production and sale of electricity. Ultimately it is the distributor
that must prove compliance with the RPS by submitting Renewable Energy Credits
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(RECs) to the state regulator. The distributor may purchase electricity from any generator
it desires so long as it also purchases the required number of RECs that are needed to
conform to the RPS. This unbundling of electricity and RECs allows greater flexibility to
meet the RPS at the lowest possible cost to the utility. Thus, having a restructured market
increases the probability of adopting an RPS by an estimated 20.6%

Increases in the price of coal and natural gas also increase the likelihood of RPS
adoption, though by a minimal amount. As fossil fuel prices increase, renewable energy
becomes more appealing. State legislatures may pass an RPS to motivate the transition
away from fossil fuels to renewables. However, a one percent increases in the price of
coal or natural gas results in a less than one percent increase in the probability of RPS
adoption. Also having a minimal impact on rate of RPS adoption is per capita GDP. A
one percent increase in GDP results in only a 0.002% increase in the probability of
adopting an RPS. This is an unexpected result. Forcing a utility to generate electricity
from renewable technologies in place of fossil fuel distorts the investment choice of the
firm and thus increases electricity prices. Assuming renewable energy is a normal good,
higher incomes are more likely to be willing to pay for renewable energy and thus more
likely to adopt an RPS. However, results from this analysis show an increase in
household incomes have a miniscule impact in determining the enactment of a
Renewable Portfolio Standard.

The percentage of democrats in the state legislature was found to have a large and
significant impact on passing an RPS. A strong democratic presence in the state
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legislature will increase the chances of adopting an RPS by 51%. Also motivating
adoption is a large existing percentage of electricity coming from renewable energy. A
strong existing renewable infrastructure is measured at increasing probability of adoption
by 47%.

Proving to be insignificant in the adoption of an RPS is whether or not the state is
a net importer or exporter of electricity. Although some RPS’s impose in state generation
requirements, not all states have this obligation. It is very simple to trade electricity
across state lines. A utility may purchase RECs from generators in surrounding states to
prove compliance with its state RPS mandate. Thus it does not matter is the state is a net
import or exporter of electricity. One suspect result is the significance of the high
percentage generation coming from natural gas impacting RPS adoption rates. These
results may be impacted by the natural gas boom in the late 1990s to early 2000s and the
development of fracking. During this time period the market moved away from coal to
natural gas. Natural gas provides a ‘bigger bang for its buck’ than coal fired generation,
producing a third the carbon dioxide as coal. As the electricity generation from coal to
natural gas was occurring during the same time frame as RPS adoption the results
estimated in this study may be influenced by the onset of natural gas.

Table 2.5 presents the results from the logistic estimation. Column 1 presents the
estimated coefficients while Column 2 lists the odds ratios. The results obtained from the
logit model are consistent with those from the probit. Positively impacted RPS adoption
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rates are a restructured electricity market, high per capita GDP, high renewable potential
and a democratic state legislature. A state with a restructured electricity market is 5.6
times more likely to pass an RPS, comparable to the 20.6% produced by the probit.
Playing a minimal role in likelihood of adoption are per capita GDP, coal price and total
number of customers in the market. Each of these estimated ratios are slightly over 1,
making them only slightly more prone to adopting an RPS. Playing a major role in
passing an RPS quickly is a democratic state legislator and a large existing renewable
generation capacity.

V.

CONCLUSIONS

As Renewable Portfolio Standards have grown increasingly popular over the past
decade it is interesting to observe which states are faster to adopt. To date, twenty-nine
states and Washington DC have passed an RPS and there is discussion in Congress over a
national Renewable Portfolio Standard. This study examines the economic, social and
political factors that prompt a state to adopt a Renewable Portfolio Standard. A fifty state
panel data set over the years 1990-2010 was assembled from the United States Energy
Information Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Database of State
Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE), and state legislative data from
Indiana State University.
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Using the data set complied for this study, I estimate a probit model to determine
critical factors to determine when a state will pass a Renewable Portfolio Standard.
Results show that adoption of a mandate is more likely when a state has a restructured
electricity market, a strong Democratic presence in the state legislature, high percentage
of electricity generation already being produced by renewables and a high per capita
GDP. The results obtained in this analysis are consistent with previous studies done by
Lyon and Yin (2009) and Huang et al (2007). Where this study contributes is expanding
the period of analysis of previous studies and incorporating the trade of electricity across
state lines. This proves to be insignificant in adoption of an RPS. There are only a limited
number of states that have in state generation requirements while the rest are able to
purchase renewable energy credits from any generators they so choose.
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TABLE 2.1:
State

Year Initially Passed

Compliance Year Standard

Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Hawaii
Iowa
Illinois
Kansas
Massachusetts
Maryland
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
North Carolina
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
Nevada
New York
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

2006
2002
2004
1998
2005
2005
2004
1983
2007
2009
1997
2004
1999
2008
2007
2008
2005
2008
2007
1999
2002
1997
2004
2009
2007
2004
2004

2025
2030
2020
2020
2025
2020
2030
2025
2020
2020
2022
2017
2015
2025
2021
2015
2021
2025
2021
2020
2025
2015
2025
2025
2020
2019

15.00%
33.00%
20.00%
23.00%
25.00%
20.00%
40.00%
105 MW per year
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
20.00%
40.00%
10.00%
25.00%
15.00%
15.00%
12.50%
23.80%
22.50%
20.00%
25.00%
29.00%
25.00%
25.00%
18.00%
16.00%

Texas

1999

2015

5,880 MW

Washington
Wisconsin

2006
1999

2020
2015

15.00%
10.00%

† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ , EIA-860, EIA-861, BEA
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TABLE 2.2:
Variable
Restructured Market

Obs
Mean
Std. Dev
Min
1029
0.266
0.442

Max
0

1

RPS

1029

0.19

0.39

0

1

Coal Price

925

205.999

128.411

70.20

2030.49

Natural Gas Price

923

533.145

292.598

140.90

6123.31

% Generation from Coal

1029

0.478

0.302

0

0.985602

% Generation from Natural Gas

1028

0.155

0.206

0

0.989443

% Generation from Renewable

1029

0.140

0.214

0

0.982843

Democrats in State Legislature

1008

0.533

0.167

0.086

0.971

Number of Customers in the

1029

2582587

2622260

1029

1.144

0.536

236622 1.48E+07

Market
Net Trade Ratio

† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/ , EIA-860, EIA-861, BEA
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0.16

3.75

TABLE 2.3:

Early Adopters
Obs

Mean

RPS States

Std Dev

Obs

Mean

Non RPS States

Std Dev

Obs

Mean

Std Dev

Restructured
Market

126

0.405

0.493

588

0.410

0.492

441

0.075

0.263

Per-capita GDP

126

40459

8178

588

37365

6088

441

32375

5067

Coal Price

111

242.87

80.66

540

221.86

158.27

385

183.74

60.54

Natural Gas
Price

112

543.09

224.19

521

533.47

330.45

402

532.71

235.03

% Generation
from Coal

126

0.275

0.220

588

0.427

0.285

441

0.546

0.311

% Generation
from Natural
Gas

126

0.268

0.185

587

0.180

0.222

441

0.123

0.177

% Generation
from
Renewables

126

0.119

0.174

588

0.142

0.213

441

0.136

0.217

Democrats in
State
Legislature

126

0.567

0.137

588

0.543

0.154

420

0.518

0.182

Num Customers
in the Market

126

34497

2856484

588

31432

2988455

441

18349

1780602

Net Trade Ratio

25
126

0.896

80
0.181

588

53

1.038

95
0.308

441

1.285

0.715

TABLE 2.4:

Probit Results
Dependent Variable: Year in which a state adopts an RPS
(1)

(2)

Restructured Market

5.4483***
(1.0683)

0.2061***
(0.0371)

Per-capita GDP

0.0007***
(0.0001)

0.00002***
(3.05E-06)

Coal Price

0.0384***
(0.0078)

0.0004**
(0.0002)

Natural Gas Price

0.0004
(0.0004)

0.00007**
(3.02E-5)

% Generation from Coal

7.8457
(3.5318)

0.4672
(0.0962)

% Generation from Natural Gas

10.6883***
(3.4234)

0.5038***
(0.0970)

% Generation from Renewable

9.8327**
(4.1242)

0.4719***
(0.0996)

Democrats in State Legislature

6.5831**
(2.8124)

0.5104***
(0.1059)

Number of Customers in the Market

6.83E-07***
(2.36E-07)

2.37E-08***
(5.27E-09)

Net Trade Ratio

0.2227
(1.2182)

0.0222
(0.0273)

_cons

-51.8073***
(5.9522)

obs
Log Liklihood
Pseudo R2

848

*** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level

54

848
-228.236
0.473

TABLE 2.5:
Logit Results
Dependent Variable: Year in which a state adopts an RPS
Coeff.

Odds Ratio

Restructured Market

11.5304***
(2.9245)

5.5707

Per-capita GDP

0.0014***
(0.0002)

1.0003

Coal Price

0.0817***
(0.0202)

1.0052

Natural Gas Price

0.0008
(0.0008)

1.0001

% Generation from Coal

10.6969
(8.1982)

125.6782

% Generation from Natural Gas

20.4260**
(8.0927)

176.2467

% Generation from Renewable

19.0957**
(9.1419)

141.9737

% Democrats in State Legislature

11.2684*
(6.0024)

322.8442

Number of Customers in the Market

1.57E-06***
(5.82E-07)
1.7435
(3.0361)

Net Trade Ratio
_cons

104.1727***
(13.8762)

Obs
Log Liklihood
Pseudo R2

848

*** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level
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1.000
1.4487

848
-229.7138
0.4696

FIGURE 2.1:

Total Number of States with an RPS
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/
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FIGURE 2.2:

Number of states adopting an RPS in each
year
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

† Source: www.dsireusa.org/incentives/
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CHAPTER III

THE MARKET FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY CREDITS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Concerns over increasing energy prices and global climate have led to the
proliferation of Renewable Portfolio Standards. In an attempt to motivate the transition
away from fossil fuels, reduce carbon emissions and diversify electricity supply, thirty
states and the District of Columbia have adopted a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS).
An RPS is a form of regulation that is passed by a state requiring electric utilities to
generation a minimum amount of electricity from renewable technologies by a specified
future date. Each state designs its mandate by specifying an absolute number of megawatt
hours or by a percentage of overall electricity generation produce that must be produced
from renewables by a targeted future date. It is designed to meet a state’s goals based on
current renewable capacities, resource endowments, political considerations and growth
potentials. Ultimately, the goal of an RPS is to motivate the transition away from fossil
fuels, reduce carbon emissions and diversify electricity supply.

In order to prove compliance with the RPS regulation established by the state
legislature, an electric utility must produce Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) to a
regulatory commission. One REC represents one megawatt hour of electricity generated
from renewable technologies. At the end of each year RECs are submitted to the state
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regulator in order to prove compliance with the RPS. In order to ensure compliance with
the standard, an RPS will establish penalties for utilities that fail to meet its specified
targets. These penalties are set above REC prices, thus creating the incentive to invest in
renewables and comply with the standard rather than pay the penalty.

The emergence of RPS regulations at the state level is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Of the thirty states with binding RPS mandates, twenty-two have
implemented them after the year 2000. Most of these policies are designed with
intermediate goals. For example, New Jersey has an ultimate standard of 22.5% of total
electricity generation to come from renewables by 2021 however also has several
intermediate goals to meet in route. Its first goal came in 2005 when 0.01% of electricity
was to be generated by solar power. In 2012, 0.3% of electricity needed to be generated
by solar power. A large increase comes in 2014 when 2.05% will need to be generated
from solar energy.

As the market for tradable Renewable Energy Credits develops it becomes
increasingly important to examine the scope and effects credit trading may have on
energy production and prices. As credit trading has had very little experience to date in
the United States this paper serves to present a detailed description of the emerging
market for RECs and discuss possible implications it may have on policy
implementation, investment in renewable energy production and prices to the consumer.
An examination is given to the New Jersey Solar Renewable Energy Credit (SREC)
market. As an early adopter of its RPS legislation in 1999, New Jersey was one of the
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first states to face intermediate goals. Having its first solar requirement come to terms in
2006, New Jersey has the most experience with tradable Renewable Energy Credits.

This paper proceeds as follows: Section two provides a detailed description of
what renewable energy credit is. Section three looks at different types of energy markets
and how RECs are traded. Section five examines how RECs are priced, section five
inspects the New Jersey Solar REC market while Section six provides a short discussion
and concludes.

II.

WHAT IS A REC?

A REC represents the property rights to the environmental, social, and other nonpower qualities of renewable electricity generation.5 Typically, a REC will describe the
date on which the electricity was generated, the location of the plant, the fuel source used,
and any greenhouse gas emissions created. The purpose for creating a REC is to allow the
green power attributed of energy to be sold or traded separately from the physical unit of
energy. (Mozumder & Marathe) Once renewable energy has been produced and
transferred to the grid, it is impossible to distinguish between electricity generated from
renewable technologies versus conventional fossil fuels. The creation of a REC allows
the utility to claim ownership of the renewable share of electricity on the grid.

5

http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/gpmarket/rec.htm
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RECs are sold and traded separately from the physical unit of energy. An electric
generator produces the renewable energy, selling it to a utility which in turn distributes
the electricity to its customers. The REC created by the production of the renewable
energy is unbundled from the actual unit of energy and sold separately. The purchasing of
the REC allows the owner to claim the rights to the renewable energy. Having no
inherent value unlike energy commodities, a REC is strictly a financial commodity that is
a product of environmental legislation.

RECs were originally proposed during the restructuring of the US electricity
industry as a tradable environmental commodity for renewable energy policies. The
concern at the time was a newly competitive industry would drive renewable energy
generation out of the market (Gillenwater). As a product of RPS legislation, RECs serve
two purposes. First, they allow the end user to claim property rights to the clean energy
consumed. Electric utilities must produce the require number of RECs in order to
conform to its RPS. At the end of each year, RECs are submitted to a third party
regulatory commission to prove compliance. Should the electric utility fail to produce the
required number of RECs it will face a penalty. Second, the money generated from the
sales of RECs serves to provide an incentive to invest in renewable technologies.
Renewable energy has great potential in the United States and has substantially grown
over the past decade. However, the immense initial investment needed in the necessary
infrastructure makes renewables significantly more expensive than conventional fossil
fuels. The sale of a REC in addition to the energy produced by renewable technologies
gives investors an extra incentive for investment as well as helps to subsidize new
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renewable projects.

Ultimately, the REC serves as a driver to increase the

competitiveness of renewable energy.

III.

REC Markets

i.

Compliance Markets

Once created, RECs can be traded in two different markets: a compliance market
and a voluntary market. Compliance markets are created by Renewable Portfolio
Standards. REC markets primarily exist in states that have undergone deregulation of the
electricity market. In states that still have fully vertically integrated markets, electric
companies produce and distribute electricity themselves. Thus any utility operating in
these states with an RPS must build a renewable generation system to produce the
necessary amount of renewable energy to conform to the regulation. In states that have
undergone electricity industry deregulation, these once vertically integrated firms have
been broken up into wholesale electricity generators and retail electricity providers.

Households ultimately purchase their electricity from retail providers and it is
retail providers that must prove compliance with the RPS. The retail provider may
purchase wholesale electricity from any generator it choose so long as it can also produce
the required number of RECs at the end of each year. For example, when New Jersey’s
RPS comes to term in 2021, a retail provider of electricity must produce enough RECs to
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cover 22.5% of all its sales; of those RECs, 4.5% must be solar renewable energy credits
in order to be in full compliance with the RPS.

The flexibility of allowing retail providers to purchase energy and RECs from
different providers allows these utilities to meet the RPS at the lowest possible cost.
According to Berry (2002), gains from trading credits derive from cost difference in
renewable energy projects from generator to generator. Some suppliers of eligible
technologies may be more efficient than others and if utilities required to meet an RPS
can shop around among suppliers, the cost of the standard can be reduced. In other words,
the retail provider will purchase its RECs from the generator that has a comparative
advantage in renewable technologies. These advantages may arise from location of the
generator and available resources that allow a generator to have a higher degree of
efficiency at renewable energy production.

ii.

Voluntary Markets

Voluntary REC markets exist for consumers who wish to purchase the attributes
of renewable energy but face no mandatory regulation. Participants in these markets
generally desire to offset their carbon dioxide emissions from their energy use, reduce air
pollution, and demonstrate civic responsibility. Participants in these markets are generally
large non-residential consumers including universities, industrial complexes, government
agencies and Fortune 500 companies.
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Prices observed in voluntary markets are generally lower than that of the
compliance markets. Voluntary markets face substantially lower demand as market
participants are not faced with binding regulations. Additionally, renewable generators
located in states with no Renewable Portfolio Standard may sell their RECs in voluntary
markets further depressing the market price.

IV.

Pricing of RECs

Pricing of RECs are strictly a function of supply and demand based upon
regulations written into each state’s RPS. Demand will be based upon the RPS target and
any technology specific carve-outs that may be incorporated into the legislation. For
example, New Jersey’s solar carve out of 4.5% by 2021 will result in Solar RECs trading
at a higher price than other eligible renewable technologies. Supply will be based on
eligible technologies determined by the legislation, available resources and several other
variable factors including weather, technological improvements, etc.

The price the renewable generators receive can be thought of as the following.
is the marginal cost to produce a megawatt hour of electricity from
renewable technologies.

is the price the generator receives for the REC. Thus the

total price the renewable energy is sold for is the marginal cost of the energy created plus
the price of the corresponding REC.
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The marginal cost of producing energy from renewables is relatively little
compared to that of conventional fossil fuels. Pricing renewables at marginal cost would
make these technologies unable to compete with that of fossil fuels. Creating renewable
generation system, such as a wind or solar farm, requires significant levels of capital
investment. The price of the REC adds an additional source of revenue serving as an
incentive to produce renewable energy.

The total revenue collected by the renewable generator is the number of megawatt
hours of electricity it produces times the total price it receives for its energy, the marginal
cost of production plus the price of the REC.

(

)

The renewable generator will choose to invest in a solar farm if the discounted
lifetime revenue exceeds that of the initial capital investment plus all operating costs.

∑

]

∑

Prices of RECs are determined in two different manners. First, a retail provider
may sign a long term contract with a renewable generator. The contract typically works
as follows. A utility will agree to purchase 50% of all of the RECs created by the
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generator in a year at a predetermined price. Given the intermittency of renewable energy
in a good year the generator will exceed expectations and produce many RECs. In a poor
year, a generator may underperform and produce fewer RECs. These long term contracts
provide retailers with a constant supply of REC and the generator with a constant supply
of additional revenue.

A second means of purchasing RECs is on a spot market. Spot market prices are
typically higher than prices found in long term contracts as the generator is absorbing the
risk. On the spot market prices may greatly fluctuate. As stated above, supply and
demand are functions of a state’s RPS. If a utility should fall short of its required goal it
faces a penalty, known as an Alternative Compliance Penalty, that must be paid to a
state’s regulatory commission. This penalty serves as a price ceiling for RECs.

Figure 3.1 depicts a supply and demand framework for a compliance market.
Supply of RECs fluctuates depending on the production of renewable energy. In the solar
market, if a given location experiences more sunny days the supply and SRECs will be
increased. If there is poor weather and many days with reduced sunlight, the supply and
SRECs will decrease. Figure 3.1 illustrates three different supply scenarios. Demand is
illustrated by the segmented green line. In the first segment, demand is equivalent to the
penalty if it is short of the quota established by the RPS. The penalty serves as a price
ceiling in the REC markets as a utility only has a maximum willingness to pay for a REC
up to the price of the penalty. If the price of a REC rises higher, the utility will chose to
pay the penalty rather than a higher equilibrium price. In the case of short supply, the
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price of a REC is the Alternative Compliance Penalty. This scenario would results in an
equilibrium price at P1 and quantity of Q1. Note that the utility has not met it quota in this
scenario. Here the utility will pay the penalty for the number of RECs it fell short (QuotaQ1) to the state regulator.

At the RPS quota demand is inelastic at any price less than the penalty and above
a price of zero. Since the utility must purchase RECs to comply with the mandate its
willingness to pay is any price short of the penalty. Recall that the number of RECs need
for compliance may fluctuate. The RPS mandate is a percentage of overall sales of
electricity. If consumption increases, the number of RECs required increases; if
consumption decreases, the number of RECs required decreases. When a utility has met
the quota established by the RPS, the equilibrium price and quantity of RECs will result
in an equilibrium price at P2 and quantity of Q2. Once the quota has been met, price of
the RECs will fall to zero. Given the surplus of RECs, purchasing RECs is no longer
mandatory at this point thus the utility will not choose to incur the additional cost.

V.

Experience with RECs

New Jersey was one of the first states to adopt an RPS in 1999. The policy has
been twice revised resulting in the current goal of 22.5% of electricity generation must
come from renewable technologies by 2021. As part of the ultimate goal of 22.5%, New
Jersey has a solar carve out of 4.5%. This makes New Jersey’s RPS one of the most
aggressive policies in the nation. In addition to having one of the most aggressive RPS’ in
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the nation, New Jersey has the largest solar REC market and one of the first intermediate
goals, making New Jersey a prime state for a preliminary analysis.

Figure 3.2 illustrates the number of kilowatt hours coming from various sources
of electricity generation from 1990 to 2012. The data was collected from the EIA. Over
this time period energy consumption consistently rises. From 1990 to 2012, electricity
consumption increased by 33%. Coal comprises the largest share of electricity followed
by natural gas. However, the total number of kilowatt hours generated by coal fell by 4%
while the total number of kilowatt hours from natural gas increased by 230%. The most
dramatic increases came from that of solar and wind energy. Solar kilowatt hours
increased by 1,028.8% while wind increased by 4,932.6%.

Figure 3.3 breaks down the composition of electricity generated from eligible
renewable technologies since 1990. These include wood, waste, hydro, geothermal, wind
and solar. During this time frame the percentage coming from renewables appears to
drop dramatically in the late 1990s before climbing back to original levels by 2010. It is
important to note that throughout this time frame New Jersey experienced a significant
increase in electricity consumption. The increase in demand was met by increases in
electricity generation from both renewables and natural gas. The substantial growth of
generation from solar energy can be seen in Figure 3.4. This is credited to the solar carve
out program and growth of the SREC market in New Jersey.
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Since New Jersey’s adoption of its RPS in 1999 its solar carve out has been
amended several times. The SREC market was initially created in 2004 before the first
compliance year in 2005-2006. An energy year in New Jersey spans from June 1 to May
31. At the time, RECs had a lifespan of 3 years. This meant that a REC purchased in
2004 could be retired to a state regulator as late as 2007. Solar targets substantially
increased in 2011 with a goal of 306 GWh for the year. It is at this time the SREC prices
reached their peak at over $600. Following this peak in mid 2011, the price of SRECs has
fallen over 80%. This is mainly due to the dramatic increase in solar energy production
over the past few years.

Contributing to the increase in solar capacity is New Jersey’s net metering
program where residential consumers who install solar capacity in their homes. The
consumer connects their generator to the grid allowing them to produce electricity for the
grid while also allowing them to consume whenever needed. The RECs generated from
this method are sold on the spot market. Figure 3.6 illustrates the increases in the number
of SRECs traded since 2004.

In July 2012 New Jersey’s RPS was once again amended to create a more
aggressive solar carve out. The goal was altered from an absolute number of gigawatt
hours of solar energy back to a sales base goal. The first intermediate goal from this
modification occurs in 2014 where 2.05% of sales must be generated from solar power.
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Status quo, increasing the quota will consequently increase the demand for RECs
ultimately increasing the equilibrium price.

VI.

An Empirical Model of REC Prices

This section introduces an empirical model which can be employed to study REC
prices. The goal is to estimate the influence of various parameters on the spot price of
Solar Renewable Energy Credits traded in each state market. The variable of interest is
the log of the spot market price of a REC in state s at time t. Time is to be measured in
months. The price of each REC will depend upon a vector of covariates that are specific
to each state’s RPS specific regulations. These include the size of the targeted quota,
weather, new renewable investment made in solar technology, amount of solar energy
generated, in instate generation requirements, and the marginal generation costs of solar
generation. The empirical specification to be estimated is denoted as follows:

Here,

is the natural log of the price of SRECs traded on the spot market in

state s during month t. This does not include any RECs that are traded in long term
contracts at predetermined prices.
s during month t.

is the number of SRECs traded in state

is a number of goal number of megawatt hours from solar
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energy that a utility must meet to be in compliance with the state’s RPS regulations. For
targets that are percentage of sales based, this number will vary based upon consumption
in a given month. All other targets will be an absolute number of megawatt hours. The
variable

measures how many years a SREC is eligible to be submitted to the

state regulator to fulfill an RPS requirement.

measures the dollar amount

of new investment in solar technologies in state s during month t.

is a dummy

variable. This assumes a value of 1 if a state has an instate generation requirement for
solar energy. If there is no instate generation requirement its value is 0.

is the

monthly number of megawatt hours produced from solar energy while

is the

marginal cost of generation of electricity from solar energy. Lastly,

is the number

of sunny days in a month in state s during month t. This is incorporated into the
regression to approximate the productivity of solar panels. The more sunny days in a
month will results in more SRECs being produced.

In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity both state and year fixed effects
need to be included. These fixed effects account for any unobserved state and time
characteristics that could potentially influence electricity rates as well as influence that
adoption of RPS regulation. These may include efficiency of solar panels, specific
regulations of an RPS, weather differences across states, etc.

This market is still developing. Complete data on REC prices are not yet available
in systematic form from the vast majority of sites. As data on REC prices become
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available, the model presented here can be estimated to help better provide evidence on
the operation of REC markets.

VII.

Conclusions

Markets for Renewable Energy Credits are complex and designed by the
intricacies of RPS mandates. RECs serve as an additional source of revenue for
renewable generators. The price of renewable energy is equal to the price of the unit of
energy generated plus the premium from the sale of the REC. Thus RECs serve as an
incentive to invest in renewable technologies. Equilibrium prices of RECs will vary
across states. This is due to difference across RPS’ including, ultimate goals, eligible
technologies, specific carve-outs, resource endowments, in-state generation requirements
and the intermittency of renewables.

The allowance of credit trading allows utilities to meet the RPS goal at the lowest
possible cost. This flexibility allows the retail provider to purchase energy and RECs
from different sources to meet its consumers demand. Retail providers may choose to
enter into long term contracts with renewable generators, turn to the spot market, or both.
Long term contracts provide retailers with a constant supply of REC and the generator
with a constant supply of additional revenue.

As technology increases, the cost of generation from renewables is expected to
fall. However, as time progresses the stringency of RPS goals increases creating
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uncertainty over future REC prices. As seen in New Jersey, SRECs traded as high at
$611 before plummeting over the course of a year to less than $300. In an attempt to
increase SREC price and maintain an incentive to invest in solar energy, New Jersey
increased the stringency of its solar carve out, driving utilities to purchase more solar
energy. It remains to be seen how if other RPS states REC markets will perform similar
to that of New Jersey’s.
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FIGURE 3.1:

Renewable Energy Credit Supply and Demand
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FIGURE 3.2:
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FIGURE 3.3:
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FIGURE 3.4:
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FIGURE 3.6:

† Source: www.njcleanenergy.com
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